How religion is not and should be positioned in sociological thinking as a peacemaking force. Argues for a non-evolutionary comparative approach towards building a constructive dialog.

We want peace. We want a public peace and we do not have it, or even much of way to talk about it. We, as a North American society, have tended to relegate peace, religion and ethics to the private sphere. Yet now we find that we want a public peace. Sociology, like the rest of the academy, has not positioned itself correctly in regard to contributing to peace, nor with regard to thinking clearly about religion and not much about peace. Now with a new call within Sociology to do a public sociology, we may consider what we can contribute towards a public peace. A correct comparative method might be helpful, as might a correct constructivist approach.

Religion is assumed to be the root of conflict and waning as we evolve. However, religion is a necessary force for peace and although changing, surely not disappearing. If Sociology wishes to contribute towards peace, or to adeptly study religion, it must correctly position itself, with one or both feet in science, and at most one foot in philosophy. Only thus might we hope to speak in a constructive way to the public.

The academy wishes that the map of culture were without religion. However, religion/spirituality continues to be strong, changing, and multi-faceted. Most of the elite consider it the root of conflict and a relic of history, while most of the populous considers it to be the only way forward. Further, Western educated people tend to relegate religion, ethics, and any consideration of peace to the private sphere (Bellah 1986). Thus, when there is conflict and religion is spoken of, there is a double assumption that religion somehow has intruded itself into the public sphere and that this is somehow deleterious. Furthermore, in our most intractable conflicts, perhaps precisely because values are in great transition and perhaps because so few people learn ethics, civil discourse, or apply themselves to moral competence, do founder on values rooted in religion. Thus the conflict perspective has subsumed the popular mind and the original structural functionalist insight that religion was the institution that quintessially promotes coherence, provides a bastion against deviance and (even to move from Durkheim to a Weberian twist,) to provides an escape from the realities of modernism, has been forgotten. Yet the reality continues to loom before us as the mountain above increasingly fruitless plains.

The hegemony of mainline denominations in this nation is all but vanished, and with it, most of the consensus about religion and civil propriety. The conservative/evangelical/fundamentalists, (grouped together for analysis purposes but hardly a block from their point of view) seem to be the only strong voice in public life, but are roundly ignored and ridiculed by the elite establishment both in media and the academy. The “New Religion Movements”-- many of them not new at all -- have become widespread, pervasive, and overlapping both the mainline and the “nothings.” The category of ‘atheist” or “agnostic” or “humanist” while vocal and influential, continues to represent a tiny but influential minority.

It is not true that secularization has won, for just as many people claim spirituality. It may not true that the enlightenment or the academy is responsible for the increased secularization or disaffiliation, as I have elsewhere adduced support that the clergy both mainline and conservative aided secularization (‘89). Nevertheless, the academy has played a large part in this divide since the time of German university ideals bringing higher criticism down to today when it is assumed (if wrongly* Eklund’08,’09,’10) that scientist are in general antagonistic to religion. Eklund has shown us that hard scientists, at any rate do affiliate with religion and often are conservative in their beliefs; it is us then, in the liberal arts department that continue to be antagonistic – or at least continue to present that appearance.

It used to be said that the middle had dropped out, but in reality, it is the young that have been left behind – often unable to follow the simplest of polemics and largely unaffiliated. Nevertheless – participation and reported importance in one’s life remains high, although with obvious age cohort differences. The rise of education is one possible cause of this change.

With regard to the lay of the land within Sociology, for the greater part of the last century, positivism was most popular in the United States. Sociology was quantitative, vying for objectivity. Later, more quantitative and even some advocacy was admitted as being part of Sociology, even though this stretched and over-stepped the bounds of science. Now the President of the American Sociology Association, Michael Buroway, has made a call for public sociology. He suggests that sociology should connect to multiple publics, defend civil society and should not assume pathological forms (Buroway).

This is welcome and salutary, if wrought with great challenge, because for too long social philosophy, the ground from which Sociology sprang has been off limits. Sociology must be allowed to go beyond the mere positivist into critical or constructivist forms for policy and public use. However, with regard to obviating pathological forms, Sociology to continue to be firmly anchored into science, an empirical discipline centered on the scientific method. Philosophy is needed in both pre-scientific work, and in the post scientific work of advocacy, but a social philosophy that is sociology must nevertheless confine itself to a connection with the core of sociology, the scientific method. Alternatively, this social philosophy must freely admit that is not scientific, that is it philosophy or something else.

Although the current assumption seems to be that religion is the root of conflict, in fact religion is the root of peace. People have conflict; they only use religion toward conflictual ends. Religion, however, back of the mother, is the greatest force in society for peace. Peace comes when a human is motivated to go beyond immediate personal concerns to care for those of others. Primary caregivers, especially female ones do teach this. There are cannot ever be enough laws or law enforcement officers to stem the tide of selfishness and violence. The first wall of deference for society against violence is the mother’s training. But who teaches the mothers? And who reinforces a mother’s teaching? The only institution that is primarily a normative, teaching, character forming enterprise in any society is the religion. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that those who affiliate with religious organization tend to have more moral competence than those who do not. This is hardly counterintuitive, however unpopular. Those who weekly consider more appropriate ways of proceeding surely will have more thoughts, more vocabulary, and it is to me hope better results around ethics. Religion is NOT the fount of all conflict, but rather the best force for peace.

Religion is that social institution which deals with ultimate questions, inculcating moral competence, most often rooted in revelation (although in some cases based in adept insight). Religion as religion restrains deviance. The mother’s knee is a greater restrain than police force, but the mother must be taught and supported by religion supporting culture. Indeed, we now have some empirical evidence, even in our developed and education and pluralistic society, that those who affiliate with religious groups do show more moral competence (Rossano, Batson 2001, 1999). This is intuitive, given that in religious groups, time is spent on considering more appropriate ways to proceed and providing social support for so doing, thus demonstrated ability to think about moral issues and demonstrated likelihood of complying with some moral set should be predictable for adherents.

It will doubtless be objected that indeed sometimes religion is the fount of religion. I argue that in general this is not the case. If the Ku Klux Klan burn crosses in people’s lawns for purposes of intimidation, this is not because the founder of or primary witness in Christianity has been followed. If Buddhists burn out Karen in Myamar or persecute Christians in Thailand, this is not because Buddha’s so modeled or taught. However, let us take the case that sometimes perhaps it would be possible for religion itself to be the cause. It is possible that there is or could be a religion whose founder died in a battle that he caused. It is possible that there could be a central teaching that urged violence. What then? Yes, this is a serious exception to my general view, because if we had a society that cohered around a violent behavioral prescription then we would have a serious, because virile case. The comparative and constructivist approach that I propose would better handle such a case as well. Let us take this though up again after we unpack the approach I propose and for now turn again to a more structural-functionalist insight that religion is at least usually the ground of coherence.

Many social problems could be ameliorated by either individual taking more responsibility or by groups taking responsibility. Public sociology may something to say about that. Religion teaches persons and groups social responsibility (to lesser or greater extent, either well or badly). Religions teach duty and altruism. All religions espouse duty to family and charity to fellow members; many extend the reach of duty and charity. Few religions espouse as valorous behavior that is elsewhere condemned as deviant. While this does happen, as for instance the Native American Church using peyote, or some Jihadists conducting suicide bombings, or conservative Christians hold to an ancient opinion that is looked upon as intolerant in the modern age, very much more often behavior that is deviant really violate codes of conduct given in their own religion, such as Hindus burning out Christian villagers is hardly resignation, Buddhists hunting Karen or harassing businessmen is not compassion, and Muslims enslaving black Africans is not equality. Often it is not the general values, but the particular application or lack thereof that are at issue.^¹

Religions do differ on many matters and some of them not trivial. Further, people do have conflicts. People have conflicts when religion is not involved. Nevertheless, since religion is available in every culture, and is the grounding of norms and often of belonging, it is predictable that people with a cause, conflictual or not, will use religion to further that cause.

Secularism cannot then paint all with same stroke, nor can it stand up to the claims of a virulent religion that espouses violence or societal degradation. If it continues its path of political or sociological correctness of painting all religions as one, then it will fall prey to lack of liberty.

Religion can be used for social change, and for the better, including for causes of peace. No other social institution is so well suited as the one which grounds norms. The Reverend, Dr. Martin Luther King could not have moved the South without having used the Baptist pulpit. Gandhi could not have ousted the British without a blood bath without having understood both the sutras of Patanjali and the British understanding of their own Christianity. Martin Luther could never have revolutionized the culture of Europe, increasing unleashing both business and science, had he not had the grounding in precisely a theological debate, grounded in a consensus revelation.

Further it is the best hope for social change toward greater moral competence, and hence peace. Social movements have been fomented without religion, but few that are large and lasting. While any religion based on revelation of the past is necessarily conservative in some ways, we only have to suggest examples of The Reformation, Indian Independence, and The Civil Rights Movement to see that religion can be powerful in the use of social change. Similarly, if we wish to find evidence of a society pulling back from self-interest and moving toward more altruism and more morality, it is the examples of communities in revival that are most salient, as for instance the Second Great Awakening, Welch Revival, and the City Revival. In the case of peace, where we need personal change aware for self-interest and toward an interest in the common good as well as massive public change, only religion gives us a hope of such.

Today, to change the world in a peaceful direction, similarly, a the few professors with papers and colloquies will not change the world sufficiently with a black regiment of cornball TV preachers, their brothers on every street corner, Sunday school teachers and everyday mothers. Only revivals – or social movements that look very much like revivals -- have brought a culture, a nation, a town from one direction to another. To talk of reigning in young people from dissolution of unemployment back to a new version of science and Yankee ingenuity, we must remember The Great Awakening. To envision prostitutes becoming morality teachers, we talk of the Welch revival. To talk of the foundation of societal movements the settlement house to abolition, we talk of the City Revivals. To picture the foundational thinking of the elites, complete with law and custom giving way to a more just order, we have to think of social movements rooted in the religion of the ambient culture.

However, if religion has fomented social change, admittedly religion has often been the buttress of the status quo. In the East, the emperors from India, China, and Japan all have turned to various religions, new or innovated, to consolidate social order. In the West perhaps the prelate maneuvered kings. Precisely, here, however, the ominous note arises, of religion used by a great political power for oppression. Religion can be court priest as well as wilderness prophet.

The question then for the one who observes is which religious expression or expressions make for peace? This becomes a ground fertile for suggesting research projects, some of the comparative type. ^²Which societies, embracing freedom of religion, find fewer conflicts? Which religions, given a free market of ideas, recruit more members? ^³ Thus a comparative approach is suggested, among others, a turning to the strength of religion, as religion, and sorting out which promote duty and altruism. Studying duty and altruism has been much neglected as we focused instead on rights and cost/benefits. The comparative approach is fraught with difficulties and thus has remained dormant in the United States and controversial elsewhere, but steering clear of Scylla and Charybdis, we may make progress.

It is preposterous to assume that all religion is bad or always leading to conflict, even religions with which one disagrees. At the same time, it is strange not to study both contributions to peace and detractions there from. In this way sociology may helpful dialogue with theologians as well as governments or business managers. Surely we wish governments that are dutifully altruistic. Surely we wish corporations that are similarly good citizens. We wish freedom, but there are of necessity some boundaries to freedom. Let’s then have a discussion about where we want those boundaries, rather than either not having a discussion or having an argument that is at once silly and unhelpful. Not all sentiments are permissible even within free speech. In this time we must sort out disagreements from bomb dropping, we much begin to talk about religion sensibly. Sociology might lead in this, studying religion well.

Of course scholars can not position religion or peace – religionists do that. However, not thinking much or well about religion. Surely the assumption of creeping secularization no longer reigns? Elsewhere I have argued with evidence from 100 years of publications from both liberal and conservative denominations that the ministers themselves contributed to secularization. I grant that it may have been their education that motivated them to do this, but in any case it was their actions and teaching that changed their denomination and its place within society. It was the ministers and the denomination who chose to mention God or the politics of the day. ^⁴

We can, however, rethink how we think about religion.^⁵ We can reposition ourselves and thus adjust the system. We should not assume that we have no moral voice (constructivist) nor that we have the only one (pathological constructivism.) Since in my view, sociology must continue to be based in science then the Weberian constructivist approach is the one open. To follow the comparative approach of Durkheim’s work would issue in a constructivism of exactly this pathological sort. Never can science, that deals only in the empirical, become a norma normans for religion that is grounded in revelation (or even adept insight.) We do not represent the moral voice, but the scientific one. As much as it is to be welcomed that we should dialog with advocacy toward peace in mind, if we then taken over the whole conversation, to become a monologue, using our then only supposed connection with science as a bludgeon, we become the oppressor.

Thus a helpful comparative approach might ask such questions s to comparing different doctrine and their results in surrounding culture. How religion affects culture and vice versa. How language and thus thought have been affected by religion. How various religions, when established, deal with minorities, the poor, or technological change. What are the alternate economic possibilities, given different religions and cultures? Similarly, when there is not one religion established, what are the results of sub-communities adhere to different religions within the same society. The findings themselves such a constructivist dialog. Under what conditions is there lasting peace?

Indeed, such studies are proceeding. Studies concerning religions’ results in physical and mental health continue. Religiosity, mediated by family prevents adolescence anomie (Batson). Religiosity may result in child abuse (Bottoms), but newer inquiries in Attachment theory may show that religiosity increasing familial attachment, and thus reduces neglect if not all kinds of abuse (cf. Irons). Religiosity may increase altruism (Books, Daley & Batson, Koenig et. al.) It would it be wonderful to know more about this mechanism and be able to distinguish between kinds of giving? Religiosity’s correlation to forgiveness has been studied (McCullough et. al.). In what ways is religiosity related to optimism (Sethi and Seligman)? All of these inquiries might be but the begining of a wider comparative study that clearly delineates how religion might be contributive (or the reverse) to peace.

Thus sociology, with at least one foot in science may become a whole influence toward peace. Public sociology must have some social philosophy but must not leave science behind – foot in each – otherwise our own despotic religion. Thus, it is vital and central to look anew at our mental maps as well as the map of religion in our society, with clear light. Once we are willing to do this, and once we have some evidence, then we might build a comparative approach and so be in a position to dialog in a construct way with religionists.

If sociology imposes a priori, it is not any longer science. If we then add the weight of a discipline, as if we were still scientific, we run the risk not only of distorting research but also imposing oppression. Sociology must not become some ideology or religion.

The comparative approach often does make the evolutionary assumption. This is unjustified in terms of being ethnocentric. It is also unjustified a priori in that we have no evidence that societies specifically evolve. Change may as much be dissolution as diffusion or evolution. If life sciences have pause for lack of evidence, we more.

We cannot as scholars institute our version of religion. In a time of pluralism, it is probably more helpful to study religion as religions. We must be careful not to be the observer that changes the observed or Hawthorne effect become Alfred Hitchcock that sociology itself becomes the new religion.

However, this does not disallow all comparative approaches. Durkheim’s method may be forgotten, but Weber’s need not be. Spencer too, has been counter posed by Radcliffe-Brown; and the new Bellah of Religion and Evolution by the Bellah of Habits, where then he does use the typifying method. However, even here, there remains a grave danger. As useful as typifying may be as a teaching device and maybe even as a necessary reductive device, there remains the possibility that the researcher may skew the ambiguity of reality toward her or his own prejudice. Nevertheless, there remains a straightforward comparative method. With enough evidence it seems entirely possible to say, we have found so many case of this behavior that result in such and such. Only in a few cases do we find the reverse and in these cases we found these other intervening variable. In this manner no a priori judgments were necessarily introduced and anyone, including religionists, may helpfully read what cause and effect might be found.

As it is, when the evolutionary assumption is made, then at least most of any pyramid so drawn will be offended. Further, some non scientific value judgments are inserted, and a great many facts are ignored. Australian Aborigines who claim to use telepathy rather than pathetic boxes to communicate with their loved ones may be far more evolved than we who must rely on technological boxes. By the same token, is “Sheilahism” more or less evolved than Roman Catholicism. Probably Durkheim would prefer the more coherent Romanism, but his evolutionary chronology is thereby ruined.

Worse than Durkheim’s ethnocentrism, is the oppressive elitism that suggests all of science is in agreement that religion is primitive (Intelligence) and can be explained away. There is a great deal of evidence that is contrary to such a reading (Eklund, Emmons, Sorokin). A work like Spencer’s that charts comparisons in more objective fashion rather than building a grand theory would be more useful.

Religion, far from being the fount of all conflict, is the ground of all peace. It is the first and most important restrain of deviance, since religion perforce teaches moral competence (Rossano). Further, since there must be freedom of religion for justice, it is thus also necessary condition for peace. Both duty and altruism are necessary to have peace and peacefulness, and only religion has thus far had success in cultivating (teaching and mentoring) duty and altruism. If scholarly pursuits can contribute to peace, as it is now hoped given the call for public sociology, then we might usefully turn to a study of how religion contributes to peace.

Social philosophers might helpfully outline some arguments as to how religion might best interact with society or how the academy might best study religion

Most of these are probably intuitive and have a growing consensus. The last, however, is most controversial. We must have religion, because it is the only route to improved individuals. If this is not true, then by all means, let us find out under what circumstances does a society cultivate the necessary altruism. Perhaps what controversy exists, does so around the values – what particular aspects are consider valorous: tolerance or discipline, creativity or restraint, engagement in political ends or charity, private or public, and so forth. There is therefore a great deal of work to do by both social philosopher and sociologist .

There is some empirical work that suggests that affiliation with religion increases moral competency. This is entirely intuitive since religion teaches denial of lesser personal good in favor of some ‘Higher good”, or in other words it cultivates altruism. It is precisely this interface between individuals and society that sociology might study (Sorokin, Goffman 67, Durkheim 1893, Bellah 1986). Once we have some bits of knowledge such as how deference is cultivated and the extent to which that is functional or not, or how density improves moral competence or not, or how pluralism increases moral competency or not—then we may have built some actionable knowledge.

The question becomes, may be have peace with many religions? There will be no peace with only one religion permitted. Currently, the erroneous and elite assumption that religion is the root of conflict, elicits a response toward putting religion down or shaming it into ever more privatized spheres. For instance, a serious and well received question by a member of LAMP toward Mr. Spence, CEO for I*ACT was, “Can we reach children before religion affects them?” This is frightening to think that due to some discomfort with someone’s religion, we might attempt to do away with all religion (while at the same time bewildered why we have so much chaos and deviance) in hopes that doing so will make for peace. If history might instruct us, it would save that oppression is the breeding ground for religion. Further, it has been noted that stamping out evil tends to breed evil, as well. We need only thing if the history of witch hunts, mass conversions, and the burning of Koresh and followers.

Thus, we can, should, and must, engage in dialogue. If we need religion for common good and cannot force religion, then what? Iconoclastic acceptance of religions qua religions – marketplace of ideas, studied by academy. (Academy is part of the marketplace of religion and surely has interacted – liberal/modernist controversy – academy ought to study itself too! Fundamentalism (Xn theology) indeed is a reaction to the effect of German intellectualism being embraced in the US academy. (Notice how Judaism reacted very differently. German Jews, transplanted to the US more likely o assimilate because less pressure, oppression.)

There is no peace without justice. There is no justice without religion or with only one. If peace cannot be obtained without religion’s salutary effects on the individual personality, and yet religion can not be forced or oppressed or coerced, then how can we proceed? We must recognize the salutary effects of religion – qua religions. Notice that this is opposite to the tendency, the sensibilities of the secular elite scholar. There is a prejudice against the religious, the committed, and the conservative. This is wrong-headed. Only the committed produce change. Therefore a new relation of scholarship (Sociology and social philosophy) to religion – as a way toward new relation between religion and society is called for. It is doubtful that we can change any particular religion’s stance. It would be extremely counterproductive to attempt to change very much government’s stance to religions. We might study what changes systems.

Here we begin comparative study – in neither the method of Durkheim nor yet of Weber. If we wish to study or promote peace we might helpfully compare and contrast religions that for instance has a founder who was a pacifist or who, by contrast promoted and conducted war or violence and resulting cultures or civilizations. We might compare and contrast recruitment methods and resulting organizations. We might compare and contrast doctrine within congregation and relative results in their sub-communities.

We can, however, contribute to a public dialogue of peace, of moral competence, of comparative evaluation, and of the study of religions. We cannot, as scholars, understand the content of a religion that is based on revelation. We cannot stamp out the thoughts of those we find repugnant. We cannot proceed toward further rebellion, boundarylessness, and disorientation. We can, however, behave in such as way as to encourage others toward moral competency, duty, altruism,

In short, we must learn to be okay with not agreeing. We must all also agree not to drop bombs, burn people at the stake, or put brain chips in people so we can turn them off. A necessary concomitant of both comparative inquiry and constructive dialog is respect; sociology must remembering it place as primarily a science – not a world religion itself. Sociology may contribute to this effort of peace by first inquiring into the concomitants and foundation of peaceful behavior in society, with no a priori posing through a proper comparative approach, secondly, by constructively contributing to public dialog.

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1 Since the hottest conflict today with regard to religion is the homosexual question, let me point out that the New Testament and Hebrew scripture nowhere suggest that any violence or denial of civil rights should be accorded to homosexuals, even though homosexulaity is viewed as a sin. Further all passages that might be interpreted as against homosexuality also include violence, crime, or oppression such as catamitism – except for one. Currently the American homosexual community is having a conversation within itself so that it is not rightly perceived as flaunting sexuality in public or recruiting others into other deviant acts; in other words there is a cleaning up going on for public relations reason but also illustrative of common values. This illustrates my contention that most of our values are held in common, with only a few at issue.

This view is in contradistinction to the one currently assumed. Let me illustrate. One person says, “We need a return to morality.” The other person says, “Yes, but whose.” Then the discussion ends. This retort is really a “condemnation of the condemner” to use Sykes and Matza’s term (Traub). We do have a consensus value on a handful of axioms and how our conflicts really are conclusions based at the periphery (Garcia). For instanced both the pro-choic3e and the pro-life person value distributive justice and autonomy. It is just that one has built a system that has ranked one over the other out on the particular issue. If we thus embraced the agreement, we would come closer to civil discourse and civil society than today where someone gains from positioning each group in a way so as to demonize the other.

3 We might find that currently in the United States, where people can freely affiliate or refrain from affiliating, they know a great deal about other religious expressions and have less conflict in some ways and more in others, than societies where a variety of expressions exist, but only some are officially permitted, such as in today’s Iran, where someone is in danger of being executed for converting.

4 Indeed there may be a trend within Judeo-Christian tradition toward secularization or at least for an embracing of a scientific worldview. For instance, notice what we now call. Genesis 1 a poem wherein the writers, probably standing in 8^th century Babylon specifically write about “lights in the sky” rather than about deities who control one’s life. Similarly, words in the Psalms prompted Jewish merchants to fund an exploration for the trade winds. Further, one main reason why Galileo and Bruno were important to the church of their time was that the church had observatories; this was a fight over patent rights. By contrast, Hinduism cannot make sense of our dichotomy of science versus religion, because for them much of their religion is an art practiced by the most learned; any such dichotomy would not exist there. If one were to follow up on these notions, as a possible research project, this would be a comparative study.

Marsden, George. (2006.) Fundamentalism and American Culture (2nd ed.) NY: Oxford University Press.

Marsden, George. (2006.) Fundamentalism and American Culture (2^nd ed.) NY: Oxford University Press.